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This essay provides an overview of the thought of the French literary and 
cultural theorist Rene Girard and attempts to contextualise his work in 
relation to other cultural thinkers such as Emile Durkheim and Friedrich 
Nietzsche. The essay begins with his theorisation of 'mimetic desire, 'the 
explanatory schema Girard utilises to theorise interpersonal relations, 
which involves a construal of desire as preeminently imitative; this model 
suggests that human beings learn what to desire from observing and 
copying others. From there, the essay moves on to discuss the 'scapegoat' 
or 'victimage' mechanism, Girard's hypothesis for how cultural and 
religious formation takes place through the banishment or lynching of an 
emissary victim in order to initiate and sustain cultural stability. Finally, 
the essay examines the relationship between the Judea-Christian scriptures 
and the scapegoat mechanism, looking at Girard's depiction of the Bible 
as representing a trenchant critique of violence, especially those forms of 
violence unconsciously used in the service of social unification. 
It seems to us that the research of Girard provides an 'Archimedian point', outside 
the terrain of classical thought, from which we might profitably de-construct 
this thought, not in the service of a nihilism which is only the negative image of 
its failure, but through a positive reflection which is capable both of integrating 
the assets of traditional philosophy and of providing a true anthropological 
foundation to the 'social sciences'(Eric Gans, 1973:581).1 
Gans may have tmderestirnated the case (Sandor Goodhart, 1996:99). 
For a social and literary theorist whose work has impacted so heavily on such 
a wide range of disciplines, the work of Rene Girard-who is currently Emeritus 
Professor ofFrench Language, Literature and Civilisation at Stanford University-is 
relatively unknown to Australian scholars. This seems particularly regrettable in the 
case of theorists of religion, as much of Girard's work has been explicitly preoccupied 
with questions of the sacred and the Judeo-Christian scriptures. This essay attempts 
a partial remedying of this situation by introducing Girard to those unfamiliar with 
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his work and providing an overview of the main currents of his thought. 
I. Mimesis: A New Theory of Desire 
Beginning with the books Deceit, Desire, and theN ovel ( 1961) and Dostoi"evski: 
du double a l 'unite ( 1963 ), Girard developed a new theorisation of desire based around 
the idea of imitation or 'mimesis'. 2 As Aristotle noted in Poetics ( 1448b 4-1 0), imitation 
is perhaps the single defming characteristic of humanity, which distinguishes itself 
from the rest of the animal kingdom through its increased aptitude and propensity for 
imitation. From the acquisition oflanguage and the development of regional accents, 
to the practices of religious discipleship and formal education, it is predominantly 
through the imitation of others that we are able to learn and come to 'inhabit' a culture. 
Girard suggests: "If human beings suddenly ceased imitating, all forms of culture 
would vanish" (Girard, 1987a:7).3 
To this, Girard adds that desire is as dependent on imitation as anything else 
that we learn; in other words, we learn to desire what others desire. Girard's theory 
rests, in part, on a distinction between 'appetites and needs' on the one hand, and 
'desire' on the other. Where the former are constituted by the biological basis oflife, 
and include such things as the basic appetite for food and water (rather than any 
particular kind of food or water), desire is a properly human characteristic, one that is 
more amorphous in its directions than appetites and far less easy to satisfy:4 "Once 
his basic needs are satisfied ... man is subject to intense desires, though he may not 
know precisely for what. The reason is that he desires being, something he himself 
lacks and which some other person seems to suggest" (1977:146). 
Thus, Girard argues that what we desire is always 'mediated' or 'modeled' to us 
by other people, who in tum have their desires mediated or modeled to them. Desire, 
in this sense, is contagious-it is capable ofbeing 'caught.' However this may conform 
to our own experience, it certainly jars with many popular and Romantic ideas about 
individual human autonomy, which tend to suggest that desires are invariably the 
product of 'inner,' subjective (rather than inter-subjective) preferences. By claiming 
that desire is 'mimetic,' Girard's view of desire appears structurally-if not 
substantively-similar to Freud's: it is most easily schematised by the triangle. Desire 
is not a single line of force, which runs between the subject and the desired object, but 
is more properly figured as a triangle in which the real energy of desire is provided by 
the mediator, who renders an object desirable: 
model I mediator 
self I subjec~==========~~:>:> object 
This understanding of desire construes it as preeminently relational; that is, 
desire (like the Newtonian notion of 'gravity') doesn't reside in any one object or 
person by itself but rather in the relationships between people. In this respect at 
least, Girard's thought remains fmnly within the tradition of French psychoanalysis 
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of the late twentieth century, which emphasised the radically social character of human 
psychology over the monadic, or individual, self (Butler, 1999). As Jacques Lacan 
(1966:73) states in Ecrits: "It is in the specific reality of inter-human relations that 
psychology can locate its proper object and its method ofinvestigation."5 
In Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure-a 
collection of studies of the novels of Cervantes, Dostoevsky, Flaubert, and Proust-
Girard moved to suggest that mimetic desire, despite his systematisation, was not 
quite his invention; the highly suggestive problematic of imitative desire was an 
incipient logic of certain novels with which Girard chose to engage theoretically. In 
these novels, he detected a comprehension of the mimetic or imitative nature of desire 
that he argued was on par with, and often outflanked, the most perceptive of standard 
behaviourist or psychoanalytic approaches to human behaviour. 
In Miguel de Cervantes' Don Quixote, the hero annoUnces his desire to be a 
perfect imitation of the legendary knight Amadis de Gaul: 
I want you to know, Sancho, that the famous Amadis of Gaul was one of the 
most perfect knight errants .... Amadis was the pole, the star for brave and 
amourous knights, and we others who fight under the banner oflove and chivalry 
should imitate him. Thus, my friend Sancho, I reckon that whoever imitates him 
best comes closest to perfect chivalry. ( qtd in Girard, 1966:1) 
The imitation of Amadis, so enthusiastically taken up by the hero, exerts heavy 
influences on Don Quixote'sjudgement, his actions, and his emotions; it determines 
his romantic attachments, religious observances, and even his vision. Quixote 
hallucinates and transforms a very ordinary Spanish countryside into a place of damsels 
in distress, lurking evil, and heroic knights. In turn, Quixote's imitation of Amadis 
itself proves to be contagious: Sancho Panza, the simple farmer who is the hero's 
companion and who imitates his master's desires, suddenly wants to become Governor 
of his own island and wants his daughter to become a duchess. 
The kind of mimetic desire at work in Don Quixote is what Girard describes as 
'externally mediated,' where the model or mediator of desire is removed from the 
desiring individual (historically, ontologically, spiritually) so that there is no realistic 
possibility for rivalry between the subject and the mediator concerning an object of 
desire. Don Quixote is as unlikely to become a rival of Amadis of Gaul, as a Christian 
is to become a rival of Christ. But Girard also provides a description of a type of 
mimetic desire structured by 'internal mediation,' a situation in which the subject's 
and the model's objects of desire overlap and become a matter of potential, and perhaps 
actual, conflict. 
In Stendhal's The Red and the Black, the character Monsieur de Renal decides 
to hire the tutor Julien Sorel on the basis that his rival Monsieur Valenod was thought 
to be planning to do the same. As it turns out, Valenod wasn't planning this, but now 
that Sorel has been employed by Monsieur de Renal, Valenod attempts to hire him-
although both men are indifferent to the educational possibilities of tutoring and seem 
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to care little for the tutor himself. That this constitutes 'internal mediation' is evidenced 
by the explicit rivalry between model and mediator, possible because both Valenod 
and Renal occupy a similar social status and live in the same town during the same 
period in history. Unlike Quixote's admiration for Amadis, the antagonists of The 
Red and the Black serve to be both models for each other's desire, but also, most 
importantly, as obstacles to its consummation. 
Drawing on that aspect of his work that detailed the propensity for mimesis to 
increasingly generate internal mediation, and hence conflict, Girard expanded his 
interests to cultural and social anthropology. By the time of the appearance of his 
third book in 1972, Violence and the Sacred, Girard had incorporated his notion of 
mimetic desire into a more general theory of cultural formation. From the idea that 
mimetic desire culminates in a conflictual scenario, Girard then moved to think about 
the sources of this potential conflict and its implications. 
ll. Violence and the Sacred: The Phenomenon of Scapegoating 
One ofthe central insights of Girard's early work was the notion that conflictual 
(internally mediated) mimesis moves in the direction ofthe effacement of differences 
between people; as rivalry intensifies, characteristics that previously distinguished 
individuals begin to erode and antagonists effectively become 'doubles' of each other. 
The intensification of the mutual imitation of rival desires and actions produces a 
situation where the protagonists become progressively more obsessed with each other 
than the putative object of their desire. They mirror each other in an attempt to 
differentiate themselves (to be the one to obtain the object of desire over the other), 
but such an intensification does nothing but eliminate differences. It is thus an ironic 
effect of rivalrous-internally mediated-desire that increasingly desperate attempts 
for differentiation work towards the effacement of all significant differences; the 
more Renal and Valenod attempt to outdo each other (in their quest for Julien), the 
more both come to resemble each other. 
This escalation of conflict and rivalry, operating through the effacement of 
differences is what Girard calls a 'sacrificial crisis,' an intensification of violent activity 
which works-starting at a local level-to progressively undermine cultural order. 
For Girard, cultural order is simply a "regulated system of distinctions in which the 
differences among individuals are used to establish their 'identity' and their mutual 
relationships" (1977 :49). Logically then, the sacrificial crisis, being essentially a "crisis 
of distinctions" (1977:49) gradually undermines the identities of subjects and the 
social hierarchies that underwrite these: "Culture is somehow eclipsed as it becomes 
less differentiated" (1986:14). 
But there is a problem with this scenario left simply as it is: If mimetic desire 
often moves in the direction of internal mediation, and if the pervasiveness of internally 
mediated desire invariably produces conflict and rivalry-the effacement of 
differences and the production of conflictual 'doubling'-then humanity seems 
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destined to seemingly endless cycles of violence and the erosion of social and cultural 
structures. Given that this is- the case (according to Girard), how then can one account 
for the development and maintenance of culture, and the continued operation ofhighly 
complex social institutions? Violence and the Sacred represents Girard's first attempt 
to pose and pursue this question in detail; it suggests that violence itself is invariably 
culture's 'answer' to disintegration and disorder. In other words, at the most intense 
moment of conflict, a violent resolution to the crisis will tend to emerge. 
Girard argues that ultimately we deal with conflict generated by mimetic 
contagion and progressive undifferentiation by means of fixing our attention on some 
marginalised figure or group and, attributing to them the cause of the tensions, move 
to expel them. The communal response to the debilitating threat of social collapse 
tends towards the attribution of cause, and the resultant imputation of blame, to an 
unprotected, marginal 'other': the scapegoat. In a situation ofheightened sensitivity 
to mimetic suggestion and burgeoning conflict, an accusatory gesture is all that is 
required to unite or reconcile warring parties around a common enemy. Thus, what 
Girard calls the 'scapegoat' or 'victimage' mechanism, describes the seemingly 
perennial means of siphoning off the internal conflict generated by conflictual desire 
by means of the elimination or banishment of a surrogate victim. This victim, by 
absorbing the projection of hostilities, is turned into the 'outsider' and carries the 
blame for the tensions; it is the victim whose expulsion or immolation temporarily 
restores harmony and peace to a community. 6 
However, the 'scapegoat mechanism' itself ensures that fmding the emissary 
victim in order to restore peace is not done consciously (here perhaps, one should 
speak of the victim as 'appearing' rather than being 'found'); the mechanism can 
only operate effectively if people believe that the expulsion is strictly necessary and 
the victim deserving of their fate. The result of this is that the only real scapegoats 
that we see tend to be other people's scapegoats: 
In order to be genuine, in order to exist as a social reality, as a stabilized viewpoint 
on some act of collective violence, scapegoating must remain nonconscious. 
The persecutors do not realize that they chose their victim for inadequate reasons, 
or perhaps for no reason at all, more or less at random. (Girard, 1987b:78) 
But, despite this arbitrariness, Girard argues that the expulsion of this scapegoat 
actually does have the effect of restoring the community to order and peace; and by 
endowing physical violence with metaphysical significance, the violence is rendered 
legitimate or 'sacred.' 
Girard's theory is ultimately about the function of violence in archaic religions, 
and how these religions manifest themselves in human cultures, even nominally 
'secular' ones. The violent movements of world history and politics furnish countless 
examples of the way in which scapegoating produces or attempts to secure social 
unanimity. Take for instance Idi Amin's expulsion of an 'unclean' Asian populace 
from Uganda, or the far more exhaustively documented attempts by the Third Reich 
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to write an economically and socially fractured Germany around the creation of a 
common enemy: the 'Jew. ' 7 In these cases, the scapegoat served to consolidate latent 
national identity; the ostracized group functioned like the proverbial black sheep that 
kept the (national) family together, however briefly. (Perhaps a cynical encapsulation 
of this scenario might be that there seems to be nothing that promises to regenerate a 
tom social fabric more swiftly than an intermittent, communal bloodletting.) 
The act of scapegoating allows for a restoration of harmony and peace to a 
group, at least for a certain length of time; it is the concerted use of violence to keep 
violence (temporarily) at bay. Girard discusses how, in Sophocles' Oedipus the King, 
Oedipus-the 'innocent' or unknowing transgressor-is driven out and in so doing 
saves Thebes from the plague that had been threatening it's survival; although Oedipus 
is not a victim of an actual lynching, he is a victim of a legal violence grounded in the 
same collective delusion, whose banishment effectively cures a community of a 
disorder that was threatening its foundations. 8 
The scapegoat mechanism is central to Girard's theory of religion which, he 
maintains, legitimizes or sacralises a certain social or cultural configuration. In order 
that peace can be restored, victimisation and ostracism are (unwittingly) utilised to 
this end. For Girard, the special function of particular kinds of religious ritual is to 
maintain the peace occurring as a result of the sacrifice by institutionalising a repetition 
of the sacrifice at the same time that this repetition works to cover up its historical 
reality. For Girard, the textual form of this 'covering up' is what he characterises as 
'myth.' 9 
Girard points out that the lynching of a victim is very often a constitutive factor 
in the constitution of polities. For instance, in the legend of the foundation of Rome, 
the twin brothers Romulus and Remus become engaged in a squabble: during the 
ensuing action Romulus kills Remus and in so doing establishes Rome and becomes 
its first king. The theme of 'warring brothers' is a very common one in world myth; 
for Girard, this theme is a mythical representation of the mimetic doubling and 
undifferentiation brought about by the intensification of rivalrous mimesis (Girard 
2001 :22). 10 The ancient historian Livy's recounting ofthis event is what Girard would 
classify as 'myth'; for Girard, myth is neither simply a 'falsehood,' nor the expression 
· of some ineffable 'truth.' Myth, in his sense, represents the trace of a real event, 
although the representation of the event itself has been disfigured in its' recounting. 
Myths "are the retrospective transfiguration of sacrificial crises, the reinterpretation 
of these crises in the light ofthe cultural order that has arisen from them" (1977:64). 
But although myths often attempt to 'keep secret' the violence that lies at their 
origin, they invariably leave sufficient clues for detection for those who are sufficiently 
textually inquisitive. In The Scapegoat, Girard examines Guillamne de Machaut's 
fourteenth century poem, Judgement of the King of Navarre (Girard 1986:1-14 ). 
Guillamne's text undoubtedly contains highly improbable, mythical elements: people 
are felled by rains of stones; there are heavenly signs in the sky; whole cities are 
demolished by lightening. Guillamne also claims that Christians died as a result of 
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Jews poisoning the water; the evildoers were duly revealed by 'heavenly signs' and 
then massacred. Girard asks what aspects of Guillaume's account might be considered 
legitimate or believable. 11 
Girard suggests that, at first, most of Guillaume de Machaut's text would seem 
highly suspect as a strictly factual, historical document; and yet, even a contemporary 
reader-accustomed to regarding all referential elements of texts with suspicion-
might suspect that actual events stand behind or beside the mythical elements. The 
'signs' in the sky, the hailing of stones, the destruction of cities by lightening, or the 
manifest guilt of the Jews and their accomplices do not strike the reader as reflecting 
a credible reporting of actual events. And yet, not all seemingly 'incredulous' events 
are of the same kind, or can be treated in exactly the same way. Behind these elements 
of the text lies an historical reality that, once discerned, the mythical elements do not 
conceal, but actually work to reveal. Girard goes so far as to assert: 
Guillaume did not invent a single thing. He is credulous, admittedly, and he 
reflects the hysteria of public opinion. The innumerable deaths he tallys are 
nonetheless real, caused presumably by the famous Black Death, which ravaged 
the north of France between 1349 and 1350. Similarly, the massacre of the Jews 
was real. fu the eyes of the massacrers the deed was justified by the rumors of 
poisoning in circulation everywhere. (1986:2) 
Girard argues that there is scant reason to disbelieve Guillaume's reporting of 
a number of deaths, despite rejecting the meaning he attributes to them; Guillaume 
furnishes us with some details of an historical event despite not perceiving the event 
adequately himself; he attributes the plague to the Jews, but we realise their innocence. 
For Girard, it is not simply historical work on anti-Semitic persecution in the 
Middle Ages that has been done that allows us to discern the credulous from the less 
credulous aspects of Judgement of the King ofN avarre. We accept that the poisonings 
could not have taken place, in part, because we know of no poison of that era capable 
of inflicting the degree of carnage reported; but we also suspect Guillaume's account 
on the basis of his obvious hatred of the accused. 
And yet, as Girard states, ''these two types of characteristics cannot be recognized 
without at least implicitly acknowledging that they interact with each other" (1986:6). 
That is, if there really was an epidemic, then it might have worked to stir up latent 
persecutory tendencies; by the same token, such a persecution might be comprehensible 
if the accusations against the Jews were proven to be correct. The correlation ofthese 
two factors prompts Girard to discard the generally endorsed rule that a text be 
considered reliable only to the level of its most dubious element: 
If the text describes circumstances favorable to persecution, if it presents us 
with victims of the type that persecutors usually choose, and if, in addition, it 
represents these victims as guilty of the type of crimes which persecutors normally 
attribute to their victims, then it is very likely that the persecution is real. (1986:6-
7) 
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In the case of a text like Guillaume's, if one attends to and works to understand 
the perspective of the persecutors, the obvious unreliability oftheir accusations against 
the scapegoats works to validate rather than undermine the informational value of the 
account, if only in terms of the violence that it depicts: "If Guillaume had added 
stories of ritual infanticide to the episodes of poisoning, his account would be even 
more improbable without, however, in the least diminishing the accuracy of the 
massacres it reports" (1986:7). The more spurious the accusations against the 
scapegoat, the more probable the mob violence reported; it is not simply the text's 
inaccuracies that prompt Girard's conclusion, but the very nature of those inaccuracies. 
This reading of social history would also apply to something like the witch-
hunts of the sixteenth century, the accounts of which have an interaction of probable 
and improbable elements that are highly suggestive of actual persecutions. In other 
words, it would be unwise to disbelieve the reality of the persecutions on the basis of 
the unreliability of the accusations directed against those so accused; although 
everything in the accounts is rendered as fact, we believe only select elements and 
our willingness to disregard those elements we consider spurious has little or no 
effect on those we think reliable. Again, it is even the case that certain kinds of 
distortion in the retelling of events make the reality of the persecution more certain: 
"the mind of a persecutor creates a certain type of illusion and the traces ofhis illusion 
confirm rather than invalidate the existence of a certain kind of event, the persecution 
itself in which the witch is put to death" (Girard, 1986:11). 
These accounts-the Judgement of the King of Navarre and the accounts of 
witch hunts-are what Girard terms 'texts of persecution': accounts of actual violence, 
characteristically, even predictably, distorted by virtue of being recounted from the 
perspective of the persecutors. Girard has also been interested in the way in which 
these texts share certain key structural features with a variety of mythological and 
dramatic texts; in these texts, Girard f"mds the same features ('stereotypes') that 
characterise texts of persecution, and thus he posits that these apparent homologies 
show evidence of the actual lynching of a scapegoat. 
In important respects, Girard work builds on that of Durkheim (1968), and 
shares many of its concerns. In the first instance, Girard, like Durkheim, rejects the 
liberal-individualist conception of society, the notion that the individual's self-interest 
constitutes the most primitive unit of society, and that community and the body politic 
are simply epiphenomena of individual decisions. For both Girard and Durkheim, 
society is prior to the individual, not something which is reducible to the psychology 
of individual agents. Religion, in this purview, is not primarily supernatural-involving 
divine irruptions into the normal workings of nature-or mystical-involving divine 
irruptions in the soul of an individual-but pertaining to the workings of the social 
group, and containing symbolic representations of social laws and bonds. 
Girard has made vigorous criticisms ofDurkheim's work, but still sees him as 
the first significant theorist to take issue with Voltaire and the Enlightenment's 
dismissal of religion: Voltaire was le premier a reagir vraiment contre cet escamotage 
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sceptique du religieux. For Girard, the "Voltairean interpretation, which is still 
dominant, makes religion the widespread conspiracy of priests to take advantage of 
natural institutions" (1987a:63). Eschewing this option-that religion is essentially 
some kind of 'trick' executed by a powerful minority-Girard along with Durkheim, 
argue that religion is foundational and coeval with society, not something that happens 
'once it gets going,' something superimposed upon realities that are more fundamental. 
Girard supports Durkheim's intuition of the "identity of the social and religious 
domains, which means, ultimately, the chronological precedence of religious 
expression over any sociological conception" (Girard, 1987a:82). 
For Girard, like Durkheim, religion always exists, however disguised and 
transformed, at the foundations of every society; there is no culture without religion 
and no religion without sacrifice. But where Durkheim emphasised the socially 
unifying function of religion, Girard emphasises its violence. Or rather, Girard 
emphasises the means by which violence functions to produce socially unifying effects, 
which he has pursued through his notion of the victimage mechanism. For Girard, 
religion has its origins in internecine and fratricidal conflict, generated by the 
conflictual ramifications of mimetic desire, and brought to momentary closure only 
through recourse to scapegoating. As already touched upon, it is a process that works 
best, strictly only ever works, when the beneficiaries of its effects are ignorant of its 
true workings. 
But, one might well ask: Is this all religion is? Girard's emphasis on the social 
and violent nature of the 'sacred' has led some to believe that his views of religion are 
entirely negative. This is not the case, however-far from it. Girard's work, beginning 
with the publication of Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, has 
increasingly engaged with properly theological questions concerning the Judeo-
Christian scriptures and their impact on archaic religion and secular forms of violence. 
ill: Violence Unveiled: The Judeo-Christian Scriptures 
Certainly the most controversial of Girard's theses concerns the role of the 
Hebrew Bible and the New Testament in the destabilisation and de-constitution of 
communities and cultures founded on sacrificial violence. If Girard's theory is to be 
believed, then there is little point in arguing over the validity of whether religious 
beliefs per se are reasonable, as all social structures--even admittedly 'secular' ones-
are shot-through with rituals of purification, sacrifice, and exclusion (ostensibly, 
quintessentially 'religious' features). 
For Girard, what is distinctive about the Judeo-Christian scriptures, culminating 
in the crucifixion of Jesus, is that the mechanism of scapegoating is itself progressively 
unveiled; the collective act of violence whose function it is to secure temporary peace 
from the conflict infecting it, and through which participants are 'saved,' is finally 
revealed and repudiated, showing its arbitrariness and its horror. For Girard, the Bible 
is a textual mechanism that enacts a startling expose of the victimage mechanism and 
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whose mission it is to alert us to this seemingly perennial cycle of the restoration of 
order through violence: it is a 'revelation' which seeks our 'redemption' from the 
violent structures of humanity: "We can see that the significance of the Kingdom of 
God is completely clear. It is always a matter of bringing together the warring brothers, 
or putting an end to the mimetic crisis by a universal renunciation of violence" (Girard, 
1987a:197). 
Girard believes that the Judeo-Christian scriptures represent an unequalled 
unveiling and trenchant critique of the victimage mechanism, substituting the 
promotion of an ethic of love and forgiveness that allows humanity to loosen its hold 
of the seemingly ineluctable necessity of scapegoating. 12 Largely at odds with the 
intellectual climate from which his work initially developed, Girard argues that the 
Bible is unique in its disclosure of the victimage mechanism through the narrative 
identification of God with the victim. 
Girard's argument is not upheld in order to minimise the less than universally 
edifying history of Christian 'mission,' of the horrors of blood shed in the name of 
Christian 'defenses of the faith' (or perhaps even the more aggressive aspects of 
Zionism). Historically, the Bible and more specifically, the Gospel message, has too 
easily been recuperated by the sacrificial structures that it had unveiled. Girard aims 
not to mitigate these atrocities of Christian history, but to provide a critique of such 
practices from within. And to grant Girard's claim of the radicalness of the unveiling 
of violence in the Judeo-Christian scriptures also draws attention to the real possibility 
that sacrificial culture's fiercest critics could very easily become its most faithful 
perpetrators. 
Although mythology's structuring of events is transfigured by the scapegoat 
mechanism, which forces a misrecognition of the events of a particular narrative by 
recounting the story from the beneficiaries of the new social order, Girard argues the 
Biblical perspective takes the point of view of the outsider and the victim. The Psalms 
contain the first sustained outcries in world literature of the lone victim, a theme 
which crystalises in Job, whose exhortations to God reveal his persecution at the 
hands of his neighbours. The same theme is again taken up in the prophetic story of 
the Servant of the Lord (Isa. 52:13-53: 12), who is scapegoated by his own people and 
does not resist; he is the "lamb led to the slaughter." The general tenor of Girard's 
arguments have precedent and have been corroborated by Jewish religious and cultural 
scholars; Abraham Heschel (1962) and Sandor Goodhart (1996) have strongly 
emphasised the message of the Hebrew prophets as centering on a progressive 
denunciation of mob violence. 13 
Girard suggests that by taking the prophets' denunciation of bloodshed and 
sacrifice and carrying it to its conclusion, Jesus institutes a social space in which all 
violence is abandoned: 
Ye have heard that it hath been said, AN EYE FOR AN EYE, AND A TOOTH 
FORA TOOTH: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall 
smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue 
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thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also (Matthew 
5:38-40). 
However, it is not simply the pronouncements, but the drama of Christ's life 
and death that has such destabilising effects on the violent structures of culture. During 
the meeting of council of high priests, Caiaphas says to the Pharisees and the other 
chief priests: "it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the people, and the 
whole nation perish not" (John, 11:50). By incorporating statements specifically 
addressed to the function of sacrifice for generating social cohesion, the Bible works 
as a textual force to reveal this mechanism, 'hidden since the foundation of the world' 
(Luke, 11:50), so that this knowledge (aletheia) might set us free. 
Girard acknowledges that he was by no means the frrst to sense the full historical 
significance of the empathy for victims that the gospel invokes. Nietzsche also 
recognised this and wrote extensively-perhaps obsessively-about it. The 
'Christocentrism' of Nietzsche's philosophy has been under-emphasised by 
contemporary European philosophers, perhaps now embarrassed by this preoccupation. 
But his denunciation of Christianity as a 'slave morality,' a religion which concerns 
itself with the weak, is utterly central to appreciating his oeuvre. In the essay "Why I 
Am a Destiny," Nietzsche asks: 
Have I been understood? What defmes me, what sets me apart from the whole 
rest of humanity is that I uncovered Christian morality .... The uncovering of 
Christian morality is an event without parallel, a real catastrophe. He that is 
enlightened by that, is a force majeure, a destiny-he breaks the history of mankind 
in two. One lives before him, or one lives after him (1967b:332/§7). 
Nietzsche even goes so far as to explicitly frame his later works in terms of a 
self-confessed 'fundamental antithesis' ofhis thought: "Dionysus the crucified." This 
antithesis is, again, predicated on a construal of Christianity as a religion that fosters 
an 'active sympathy' or pity for the victim. fu book four of The Will to Power, Nietzsche 
specifies the "two types: Dionysus and the Crucified." 
Dionysus versus the crucified: there you have the antithesis. It is not a difference 
in regard to their martyrdom. It is a difference in the meaning of it. Life itself, its 
eternal fruitfulness and recurrence creates torment, destruction, the will to 
annihilate. In the other case, suffering-the "Crucified as the innocent one" -counts 
as an objection to this life, as a formula for its condemnation .... The god on the 
cross is a curse on life, a signpost to seek redemption from life; Dionysus cut to 
pieces is a promise oflife: it will be eternally reborn and reborn and return again 
from destruction (1967a:542-543/§ 1052). 14 
In relation to Girard's work, the significance ofNietzsche's 'antithesis' is difficult 
to over-emphasise. Dionysus is the wandering god, associated with wine, madness, 
and most importantly, the bringing and destruction of culture, often through military 
power. As a performative genre, Dionysian ritual is associated with the dismemberment 
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of a sacrificial victim to appease the deity, a ritual repetition of what was believed to 
have happened to the god himself. 
Like Nietzsche, Max Weber, in Ancient Judaism, emphasises repeatedly that 
the authors of the bible take the side of the victim (1952:19-22, 86; 475-476; 492-
495). And Eric Gans, professor of French at UCLA, states, "Christianity's impact on 
the West is a tribute to the power of its basic conception, which is the absolute centrality 
of the position of the victim" (1982:4). In light of this, Girard believes that the effect 
of Jesus's crucifixion was effectively an unveiling of the illegitimacy of violence, 
unconsciously used in the service of social tranquility. 
Undoubtedly, Girard's work continues (by other means) Simone Weil's intuition 
that before offering a theory of God, a theology, the Biblical tradition offers a theory 
ofhumanity, an anthropology. As such, Girard's work sheds surprising light on those 
elements of Biblical texts most often considered 'mythical,' or 'fantastic'· by the 
contemporary mind. For instance, in suggesting, as the Gospels do, that those involved 
in Jesus' crucifixion were on the side of'Satan' is simply to render tangible, through 
personification, the power of rivalrous desire which engenders violence and accusation; 
consistent with this reading, the New Testament is continually at pains to indicate 
that evil has power only insofar as it is embodied in a particular person or group. 
Satan has no real being, existing only as a parasite on humans, as the Bible tells us he 
does on God. Thus, the personification of Satan as rivalrous mimesis-as that which 
engenders accusation and violence--is necessitated by the way in which this power 
attaches itself to the victim at the epicenter of the scapegoat mechanism: they are 
viewed as a demon or devil. 
Further, Satan is a Hebrew word which means 'the accusor'; the Christian 
revelation also speaks continually of Satan as 'the father of lies' and the 'murderer 
from the beginning' (John 8:44). That lie, suggests Dominique Barb6-with an insight 
that parallels Girard's-consists precisely in covering over the violence that lies at 
the base of all societies (1989:54). This construal makes sense ofthe Biblical claim 
that Satan is both the archon, the ruler or prince of this world, and the arche, the 
'beginning,' the spirit of murder that founds the earthly polis. 
To understand this evangelical anthropology, we must complete with it the Gospel 
statements concerning Satan. Far from being absurd or fantastic, they use.another 
language to reformulate a theory of scandals and the working of a mimetic 
violence that initially decomposes communities and subsequently recomposes 
them, thanks to the unanimous scapegoating triggered by the decomposition. 
(Girard 2001:182). , 
Girard argues that this revelation attempts to disclose not simply the innocence 
of one victim, Christ, but all victims. Needless to say, the fruitfulness of Girard's 
thinking on religion continues to prompt considerable amounts of ongoing theological 
reflection. 15 
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Conclusion 
The validity and usefulness of Girard's ideas are, at this point, somewhat difficult 
to gauge. It is a body of work-both in its conclusions and in its methods-that is 
largely out of step with current theoretical trends in the humanities and social sciences; 
and yet in itself, it is hard to see this as necessarily a disrecommendation. Perhaps 
Girard's greatest potential as a theorist of culture is the extent to which his work 
sheds welcome light on the vexing question of how and why violence seems central 
to many religious practices and expressions. 16 As I have argued, Girard's somewhat 
paradoxical formulation suggests that religion provides a mechanism for defusing 
and controlling violence through violence; it 'contains' violence in both senses of the 
word: it deploys so-called 'good,' sanctioned violence against 'bad. 'With his insistence 
on the links between violence and cultural formation, Girard's work seems both 
profoundly contemporary and yet suggestive of the continued presence the 'archaic'-
the 'primitive,' the violent, the 'tribal'-in the so-called 'civilised' present. 
As might be expected, responses to Girard's work have been very mixed; where 
some critics see tendencies toward 'reductionism,' advocates are prone to see 
theoretical elegance and explanatory fruitfulness. Indeed, his work has prompted 
fierce criticism, but has also inspired the establishing of an academic journal 
(Contagion: The Journal of Violence, Mimesis and Culture), numerous conferences 
and symposia, and a considerable amount of interdisciplinary engagement from areas 
as diverse as economics, philosophy, psychology, and musicology. Perhaps, ultimately, 
the most pertinent question is not whether all of Girard's ideas are perfectly 'true,' or 
have absolute referents in the .. world, but whether his thinking presents powerful 
hermeneutic or heuristic means through which culture may be profitably approached. 
Girard is, at the very least, a provocateur, someone who theories hold out considerable 
generative scope, and commensurately, also much need for further scrutiny and 
analysis. 
NOTE: Thanks to Mindy Sotiri, John Fleming, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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Endnotes 
1 "ll nous semble que les recherches de Girard fournissent un << point archimedien >> en 
dehors du terrain de Ia pensee classique d'ou nous pouvons de-construire celle-ci au profit, 
non d'un nihilisme qui n' est que I' image negative de son echec, mais d'une reflexion positive 
capable a Ia fois d'integrer l'acquis de Ia philosophie traditionnelle et de donner un veritable 
fondement anthropologique aux <<sciences humaines >>." 
2 'Mimesis' is a Greek word, meaning 'imitation.' There are two primary reasons that Girard 
chooses to use the word 'mimesis' rather than simply 'imitation' in his discussion of desire: 
firstly, the latter term tends to imply that the desire is invariably conscious, rather than something 
that very often occurs below the level of awareness, and secondly, the word mimesis has 
conflictual valences that the word 'imitation' does not bear out, and which are central to Girard's 
theorisations (discussed in the second part of this essay). 
3 Although Girard's statement concerning the overarching importance of imitation in human 
development may seem hyperbolic (and perhaps at odds with empirical science), it has received 
strong, albeit indirect, corroboration from studies in cognitive and developmental psychology 
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(Meltzoff 1977, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c) and cognitive science (Gallese and Goldman 1998; 
Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998; Ramachandran 2001). Additionally, the role of imitation in the 
behaviour of non-hUlllan animals has also been a repeatedly studied feature of contemporary 
ethology (De Waal, 1996: 19-20, 71-73 ). And fmally, although such an investigation is beyond 
the scope of the current paper, there are interesting resonances between Girard's notion of 
'mimesis' and what psychoanalysts term 'identification,' Judith Butler's (1990) notion of the 
'performative citation,' and Louis Althusser's (1971) notion of 'interpellation,' all of which 
(broadly) figure corporeal or symbolic imitation as a key element of subject formation. 
4 There are parallels here between Girard's schema and Hegel's distinction in The 
Phenomenology of Mind between 'the sentiment of self' (which is common to non-human 
animals) and 'self-consciousness' (which is pa1ticular to hUlllans) (Hegel1967). 
5 The permeation of the social field into the 'self' has placed French social psychology largely 
at odds with American ego psychology, with the latter's emphasis on the 'strengthening' of the 
ego. 
6 It is interesting to note that in the French and German languages, the main words for 'victim' 
(French: victime, German: Opfer) also mean 'sacrifice.' 
7 Of course, this simplifies a very complex state of affairs; the scapegoating of Jews has a very 
long history in western culture. For a Girardian reading of the Holocaust from a Jewish 
perspective, see Goodhart (1996): 215-288. 
8 Girard's choice of the myth of Oedipus for an analysis of scapegoating is strategic; he is here 
contesting the Freudian engagement with the same text (cf. Freud, 1955: 65-143; 1961: 1-66). 
For Girard's engagement with Sophocles and Freud, see Girard ( 1977: 169-222); (1987a: 352-
392). 
9 The root of the Greek word for myth, muthos, is mu, which means 'to keep secret' or 'to 
close.' In Girard's conceptual scheme, 'myth' refers to a cultural memory that operates selectively 
or discretely. 
10 For Girard's discussion of Romulus and Remus, see Girard (1986: 88-94). The French 
philosopher Michel Serres (1991) has written a book about the foundation of Rome and the 
saga of Romulus and Remus from a distinctly Girardian perspective. 
11 Note the structural similarity between "the Jews" in de Machaut's poem and Oedipus; a 
'plague' is eventually halted by the lynching or banishment of a scapegoat, although neither 
text quite 'owns up' to the mythological concealment ofvictimisation. 
12 Jacques Derrida has recently written that 'forgiveness,' which fmds its ultimate grounding in 
the notion of the sacredness of the human, is a culturally specific notion, derived from the 
"Abrahamic memory of the religions of the Book, and in a Jewish but above all Christian 
interpretation of the 'neighbour' or the 'fellow man'" (2001:30). 
13 Even the (often criticised) Judaic principle of retributive equivalence (an 'eye for an eye') 
works to curtail escalating violence through setting strict temporal and qualitative limits to 
punitive justice; in doing so, it represents tangible progress in the judicial application of moral 
judgement, as it works to halt the tendency for violence to enter what communications theorists 
call 'positive feedback loops,' spiralling upward in ever-increasing amounts. 
14 These are by no means the only references Nietzsche makes regarding Christianity and its 
"active sympathy for the weak" (cf. Nietzsche, 1990: 127-131/§2-§7). 
15 See, for instance Alison (1996) & (1998); Bailie (1995); Goodhart (1996); Hamerton-Kelly 
(1992) & (1994); Williams (1991); and Schwager (1991) & (1994). 
16 An edition of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence was dedicated to Girard's work. 
See Juergensmeyer (1991). 
